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Abstract:  
This paper examines the link between globalization measured by foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises in a multi-country sample that focuses on developing countries. We 
hypothesize that privatization has an effect on FDI/FPI as the process of fostering 
private sector participation was often accompanied by liberalization reforms, and by 
allocations of substantial shares in newly privatized firms to foreign investors. Similarly, 
we expect FDI/FPI to foster privatization efforts as new capital inflows, technology and 
managerial skills that accompany FDI/FPI make the environment more prone to 
competition, providing governments with incentives to privatize inefficient firms that need 
to be turned around. This relation is assessed in two ways, first in a dynamic panel using 
a generalized method of moments approach, and second through panel causality tests. 
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1 
PRIVATIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
1 Introduction 
Twenty-five years ago, many countries around the world launched economic reform programs to foster 
private sector development, mainly through the privatization of state-owned entities. The primary aim of these 
programs is to decrease government control in the economy, and to transfer the ownership of former state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) from the state to private investors. As pointed out by Shleifer (1998), the inefficiency of SOEs 
that was largely blamed on the political objectives pursued by the bureaucrats who managed these firms, was the 
principal impetus for privatization. Other objectives of the reform included boosting local stock markets and 
improving the country’s institutional environment. The reform then spread worldwide as economic globalization 
and markets integration increased. In a world with more intensive international competition, more liberalized 
stock markets worldwide and less restrictive trade barriers across countries, the need to develop and foster private 
sector activities became a necessity, leading to an international shift of economic policies towards private sector 
development. 
The pace of the privatization process has been both sustained and global, still today, after more than two 
decades elapsed from its start (World Bank, 2006). When countries promote economic policies that favour private 
ownership, they simultaneously attract the attention of foreign investors, either of multinational corporations, in 
the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) or of individual and institutional investors in the form of foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI)
3
. In the case of developing countries, the World Bank (2003) notes, for instance, that 
FDI has become the largest and most resilient form of capital flows. Some studies sustain that privatization was 
instrumental in the FDI growth observed worldwide. For example, Baer (1994) notes that privatization had an 
impact on foreign investments in many Latin American countries, where the increase of foreign capital has been 
accompanied by a decline in the extent of involvement of the state in the economy. Likewise, The World Bank in 
its 2008 Global Development Finance notes that the surge in FDI inflows to Europe and Central Asia in 2007 was 
associated with privatization programs as was the case for the large volume of FDI inflows to Latin America in 
the late 1990s. Other arguments in the literature hold that privatization, often accompanied with a combination of 
other measures that aim to improve the investment climate, lift barriers to trade and provide a better and more 
effective institutional environment, contributed to the rise in FDI flows over the last twenty years.  
The past twenty-five years have also been marked by an impressive growth in the stock market 
capitalization of most countries. Boutchkova and Megginson (2000), Perotti and van Oijen (2001) and Bortolotti 
et al. (2007) show that share issue privatizations had a major impact on the growth and liquidity of non-U.S. stock 
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 Portfolio investors are mainly profit-motivated, whereas direct investors seek to exert control over assets. 
2 
markets and on the participation of individual and institutional investors therein, particularly through the 
allocations to foreigners in initial public offerings of privatized firms. However, it could also be argued that 
economic reforms, like trade and financial liberalization, as well as overall institutional reforms including 
reduction of bureaucracy, control of corruption and improvement of investors’ rights protection, would spur 
globalization through FDI and FPI, independently of the launching of privatization programs.  
Like privatization, FDI and FPI, two proxies for globalization, have witnessed a significant and steady 
progress around the world. The rising trend in FDI around the globe is analyzed in several World Bank reports. 
Particularly, the World Bank (2002) reports that FDI has positively responded to government implementations of 
privatization programs, and notes that seven of the ten largest FDI recipients received more than $US1 billion 
from foreign investors to participate in the privatization transactions that were conducted in 1999. The intensity of 
the privatization program seems to be strengthened by massive increases in FDI flows which continued to 
increase throughout the 2000s. FDI brings about many benefits ranging from fund-raising, new technologies, 
improvements in human capital, new managerial skills and improved corporate governance. It comes thus as no 
surprise that several privatization transactions on the stock market involved the sale of a tranche directly aimed at 
foreign investors. Likewise, The World Bank reports that the net portfolio equity inflows to developing countries 
increased dramatically over the recent period: from $11 billion in 1999 to $145.1 billion in 2007 (Global 
Development Finance, 2008). The joint foreign investment inflows (direct investment and portfolio investment) to 
developing countries totaled $536 billion in 2008, down 19 percent from the $664 billion recorded in 2007 but 
still almost 14 percent higher than the inflow recorded in 2006 (Global Development Finance, 2010). This 
suggests that developing countries still draw a major source of funds from foreign investors. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the link between privatization and globalization, measured by 
FDI and FPI, for developing countries. We focus on developing economies including Brazil, Russia, India and 
China (BRIC) due to their importance in attracting foreign investors. Also, developing countries display more 
homogeneous levels of economic development as well as institutional and legal environments which substantially 
differ from those of developed countries. More specifically, we examine in this paper the potential bi-directional 
causality between privatization and globalization. In particular, we investigate whether privatization is a 
determinant of globalization, and whether globalization enhanced and contributed to the sustainability of the 
privatization process. To our knowledge, this is the first multinational empirical study of the potential link 
between privatization and globalization. The use of international data from developing economies allows us to 
provide new evidence and to draw several novel insights and policy implications. 
Besides, it is important to keep in mind that we are interested in the sum of inflows and outflows FDI/PFI, 
which varies with the level of economic development. For instance, while large-scale privatization programs in 
developed countries are aimed at reducing their budget deficit, and spreading popular capitalism, developing 
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countries launch these programs to attract foreign investment, and financial help from world development 
agencies. Developing countries thus mostly face foreign inflows. Although we are interested in globalization in 
general, namely inflows and outflows, foreign capital flows are less likely to go in both directions for developing 
countries. 
The empirical analysis of the role of privatization in determining foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI), and the role of FDI and FPI in affecting privatization is important for several 
reasons: First, FDI and FPI flows are an engine for future economic growth and institutional development. 
Examining the role of specific economic reforms as a determinant of FDI and FPI flows is thus important for 
policy purposes. Second, assessing the link between a redistributive (often opposed) policy such as privatization, 
and an equally controversial phenomenon, such as FDI and FPI, is important on theoretical grounds. Several 
governments met strong opposition as they launched privatization programs, further fuelled by the announcement 
that the potential buyers were foreign investors. Previous firm-level studies have examined the link between 
foreign participation and postprivatization firm performance (e.g., D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Harper, 2002; 
Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami, 2005a, Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami, 2005b). On the macro-economic level 
however, whether globalization and privatization are mutual determinants remains an issue to explore. 
Why, beyond the anecdotal evidence described above, should privatization and globalization be related? 
Several potential channels can be put forward. First, privatization usually improves the investment climate thus 
making investment more attractive for investors, domestic and foreign alike, and contributes to enhance the 
growth and development process. For instance, a recent study by Boubakri, Cosset and Smaoui (2009) shows that 
privatization contributes to the improvement in the overall institutional quality of the country –i.e. its rule of law 
and law enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, Mishkin (2009) argues that globalization is a powerful driver of 
institutional reforms, particularly in developing countries. Second, while the effect of privatization on growth 
remains yet to be assessed, available evidence from countries that pursued privatization does reveal significant 
positive outcomes, especially at the firm level (see Megginson and Netter, 2001, for an extensive review of this 
literature). Finally, within the context of private risk taking, privatization should reinforce the globalization 
phenomenon as privatization, through share issues, has a positive impact on stock market developments and 
drains FDI and FPI flows. Parallel to this effect, we also argue that more financially open economies are more 
likely to privatize extensively. These mechanisms of transmission between globalization (FDI/FPI) and 
privatization have been unexplored to date. Although privatization and globalization are two concomitant, 
reinforcing mechanisms, they have always been treated in two separate strands of the literature: The privatization 
literature has focused on the outcome of the reform on several aspects, such as the performance of newly 
privatized firms, corporate governance, legal institutions, stock market liquidity, etc. The FDI literature has 
instead focused on its impact on economic growth and welfare, and social inequality (e.g., Noorbakhsch, Paloni 
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and Youssef, 2001; Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 2001; Khawar, 2005). The FPI literature has also mostly focused 
on the impact of foreign equity flows on the benefits and extent of international portfolio diversification,  local 
stock prices and stock market volatility (e.g., French and Poterba, 1990; Cho, Kho and Stulz, 1999; Froot, 
O’Connell and Seasholes, 2001; Karolyi and Stulz, 2003). 
Using a sample of 56 developing countries, over the period 1984 to 2006 that ends up just before the 
financial crisis, we run the following: First, we implement a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach in 
a dynamic panel context to estimate the parameters. This approach allows us to control for the problems of joint 
endogeneity of the independent variables, reverse causality and simultaneity, and country heterogeneity, i.e., 
unobserved country-specific fixed effects (see Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995)) that 
produce inconsistent estimators. In addition, this estimation approach makes use of information contained both in 
levels and differences to yield efficient estimators of the parameters. Second, we conduct formal causality tests in 
both directions, from privatization to globalization, and from globalization to privatization, in a closely-related 
panel specification as proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), using a GMM estimator based on a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) first-step estimator. Finally, we conduct tests of weak instruments as 
recommended by Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), Stock and Yogo (2005) to check whether the causality tests do 
not suffer from size distortions due to weak instruments, for the results to be reliable. Thus, not only the 
instruments employed in the instrumental variable estimation technique have to be valid (i.e. not correlated with 
the disturbance term), but also relevant (sufficiently correlated with the endogeneous variable to be replaced) for 
the results to be meaningful (unbiased estimators and correctly sized tests). 
In so doing, we find support for our principal conjecture: Indeed, after controlling for several factors 
shown to determine privatization, we find that globalization has a positive effect on privatization proceeds and 
privatization method. We also find that privatization proceeds and the privatization method do influence the 
extent of FDI in a country, suggesting that FDI flows and privatization are interrelated. However, the results do 
not support the hypothesis that privatization impacts FPI. Our results suggest that privatization can be 
instrumental in attracting FDI, which can contribute to domestic economic growth: privatization through share 
issues fosters stock market development, and financial development is known to exert a major influence on 
economic growth (Levine, 2004; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005). By the same token, privatization 
constitutes a credible signal of less policy risk for foreign investors, and contributes to attract more FDI. When 
performing panel causality tests, we do find evidence of a bi-directional causation between both phenomena 
confirming our hypothesis that globalization (through FDI) fosters privatization and vice-versa. However, when 
globalization is measured by FPI, we are unable to reject the null of no causality between both phenomena. More 
specifically, the dynamics and channels of transmission between the privatization method and FPI are more 
difficult to identify. 
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As robustness checks, we control for business cycle influences, political orientation of the government, investors’ 
rights protection, and international accounting standards. Our results remain robust to these checks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some stylized facts on FDI/FPI and 
privatization. Section 3 discusses the empirical approach and the variables. Section 4 presents the sample, some 
descriptive statistics and discusses the empirical results along with robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Stylized facts and testable hypotheses 
The literature on privatization suggests that domestic economic conditions influence the decision of 
governments to privatize, and the way they structure privatization. For instance, governments facing high budget 
deficits, or fiscal crises are more likely to undertake privatization (Ramamurti, 1992). Also, Megginson, Nash, 
Netter and Poulsen (2004) argue that countries with higher deficits are more likely to privatize state-owned assets 
by share issued privatizations (SIPs) than by private sales. However, Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2005a) 
show that whether privatization is implemented by SIPs or private sales in developing countries, foreign direct 
investment is omnipresent (foreign investors participated in 86% of privatization transactions between 1980 and 
1999 in developing countries). The literature (e.g., Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003) has identified other 
determinants of the decision to privatize: for example, the role of the political orientation of the government 
conditions the decision to privatize as right-wing governments who wish to promote “popular capitalism” are 
more likely to privatize than left-wing governments. In addition, a financially-distressed government faced with a 
high level of public debt is more likely to privatize in order to meet its financial obligations, and countries with a 
lower protection of investors’ rights and a weak legal environment are less likely to privatize.  
FDI and FPI flows can be additional potential determinants of privatization. Since FDI enhances the 
competitiveness of the domestic economy, contributes to more skilled labour, helps to import new technology, it 
should result in a positive externality on the environment. As a consequence, governments will have more 
incentives to privatize if the economy is more open to foreign investment. Hence, we expect that more foreign 
direct investment in the country will contribute to enhance privatization efforts by local governments. FDI and 
mainly FPI flows will also create new inflows for governments willing to privatize through SIPs.
 
This discussion 
leads to the following hypotheses:  
H1A: Globalization (that is, FDI and FPI) has a positive impact on privatization proceeds, everything else being 
equal. 
H1B: Globalization (that is, FDI and FPI) has a positive impact on the proportion of share issue privatizations in 
the total number of privatizations transactions, everything else being equal.  
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The literature also identifies several determinants of FDI and FPI. Li and Resnick (2003, p.203) argue that 
with respect to foreign direct investment: “While increasing levels of democracy help to produce better judicial 
systems and rule of law, these higher levels of democracy also drive foreign investors away by imposing 
constraints on foreign capital and the host government.” Law and order means a more predictable regulatory 
environment, less prone to unexpected policy reversals, and is therefore consistent with a more transparent 
policymaking process. 
Financial liberalization is also a determinant of FDI and FPI. Financial liberalization allows foreign 
investors to invest, without particular restrictions, in the domestic market, and allows domestic investors to trade 
freely on international financial markets. The recent liberalization reforms in emerging markets resulted in an 
increased presence of foreign investors that typically bring in addition to their funds, stricter disclosure rules, 
more accounting transparency, new management and governance skills (see Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 
2005). Market-related variables such as GDP (market size), GDP per capita and GDP growth also represent 
traditional FDI determinants (see, for example, Schneider and Frey, 1985; Tsai, 1994) as well as trade 
liberalization which measures the extent of openness of the country to foreign trade which is shown to be 
positively related to FDI flows. 
The literature on cross-border equity transactions focuses on the role of two key determinants: 
information frictions and the quality of host-country institutions. Portes and Rey (2005) find that, in addition to 
market size, efficiency of the transactions technology, distance, a proxy for information frictions, has a negative 
effect on the level of cross-border equity flows. The authors suggest different proxies for the degree of 
information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors including telephone call traffic, the degree of 
overlap in trading hours, multinational bank branches to account for information transmission, and insider trading. 
In a more recent study, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) show that cross-border portfolio investment is sensitive to 
different institutional indicators like the degree of information disclosure in local credit markets regulations and 
accounting standards in the host country. The authors also document that portfolio investment reacts to the risk of 
expropriation and repudiation costs, confirming Albuquerque’s (2003) hypothesis that portfolio investment is 
easier to expropriate than other types of investment. Finally, stock market openness and development appear to be 
positively related to cross-border portfolio investment.  
In addition to these classic determinants of FDI and FPI, we consider the potential impact of privatization. 
We argue that if the governments’ objective is to attract FDI or FPI flows, a credible environment of contract 
enforcement and transparency needs to be put in place. Privatization can provide the government with such a 
credible signal (Perotti, 1995), particularly in the case of share issue privatization (by opposition to private sales). 
Perotti’s model suggests that gradual sales, with an immediate transfer of control, signal that the government is 
ready to assume residual policy risk and that it does not intend to alter the value of newly privatized firms through 
7 
a future change in economic policies. Therefore, share issue privatizations should signal commitment to investors 
whose increased confidence is likely to attract more FDI and FPI flows. This discussion leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
H2A: Privatization proceeds have a positive impact on globalization (that is, FDI and FPI), everything else being 
equal. 
H2B: The proportion of share issue privatizations in the total number of privatization transactions has a positive 
impact on globalization (that is, FDI and FPI), everything else being equal. 
 
3 Methodology 
The methodology is threefold. First, we identify (possible) reinforcing links between both phenomena, 
privatization and globalization, using a GMM-system estimation technique in a dynamic panel setting as 
recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995), to exploit information on both 
dimensions, namely cross-sectional (across countries) and time-series. Second, we conduct formal causality tests 
in both directions, from privatization to globalization, and from globalization to privatization, in a closely-related 
panel specification as proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) , using a GMM estimator based on a 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) first-step estimator. Finally, we conduct tests of weak instruments as 
recommended by Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), Stock and Yogo (2005) to check whether the causality tests do 
not suffer from size distortions due to weak instruments, to ensure that the results are reliable. 
3.1 Dynamic panel GMM-system estimation technique4  
This approach allows us to control for the problems of joint endogeneity of the independent variables, reverse 
causality and simultaneity, and country heterogeneity, i.e., unobserved country-specific effects (see Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995)). Specifically, we are concerned with finding empirical evidence that 
would support the hypothesis of the two-way relation running from FDI/FPI flows to privatization and vice-versa. 
Therefore, we make use of an empirical strategy which does account for a simultaneity bias arising from a 
possible reverse causality between both phenomena in a dynamic panel data set. In other words, we resort to the 
dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM, following Blundell and Bond (1998), that addresses these 
endogeneity problems by exploiting all the information contained in the data set to provide valid instruments. 
Following Windmeijer (2005), we also implement the finite-sample corrected standard errors for the efficient 
two-step GMM estimator throughout the procedure. Without this correction, the two-step GMM standard errors 
are known to be severely biased downwards leading thereby to mechanically low p-values. 
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Since the validity of GMM estimates crucially hinges on the exogeneity assumption for the instruments, 
we perform the Hansen J over-identification test to check for the joint validity of the moment conditions. In 
addition, we test for autocorrelation by applying the Arellano and Bond test to the residual in differences. This test 
should find spurious autocorrelation of order 1 and no sign of autocorrelation of order 2 in the residual first 
differences. Furthermore, to identify the impact of privatization on FDI/FPI flows and reciprocally, it is necessary 
to control for some effects already identified in the literature. The design for our panel data analysis will 
incorporate the influence of the other factors as follows. 
For the privatization equation, we consider:  
itiitititit
CLVFDIPRIVPRIV  
 11
 
itiitititit
CLVFPIPRIVPRIV  
 11
 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) flows equation is as follows: 
itiitititit
CLVPRIVFDIFDI  
 01
 
The foreign portfolio investment (FPI) flows equation is as follows: 
itiitititit
CLVPRIVFPIFPI  
 01
 
i  denotes the country, Ni ,,1 , and t the time index, Tt ,,1 , for yearly observations; 
i
 will account for 
the unobserved country-specific effect. 
it
CLV  represents country-level variables that control for the potential 
determinants of  either privatization, or globalization (FDI/FPI). Table 1 provides the list of the country-level 
variables we consider. 
3.2 Panel causality tests 
We adopt the following dynamic specification for the panel data causality tests (Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 
1988), and thus investigate the potential causal relations between both phenomena, i.e. from privatization to 
globalization (FDI/FPI) and vice versa:  
.~
22112211 itiitititititit
xxxyyy  

 
To remove the country-specific fixed effects
i
 , the model is differentiated. In doing so, we introduce a 
simultaneity problem because the error term becomes correlated with the regressor
21 

itit
yy . Indeed, 
1it
y in 
21 

itit
yy  is by construction correlated with 
1

itit
  in the specification in differences: 
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Therefore, an instrumental variable estimation based on GMM is conducted to tackle this 
simultaneity/endogeneity issue. Note that the three-stage least-squares estimator is a GMM estimator that uses a 
slightly different weighting matrix than the optimal GMM, but uses the same orthogonality conditions. The 
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instrumental variables used in the estimation increase with t , as more information is included when t increases. 
Using the GMM estimator with the weighting matrix evaluated at the 2SLS estimator, we are able to perform 
panel causality tests as recommended by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988). Also, the test statistic revolves 
around the sum of squared residuals, and therefore is easy to implement. Indeed, the statistic to test the null 
hypothesis that x does not cause y, involves linear restrictions on the estimated parameters. Specifically, the null 
hypothesis of no causality running from x to y corresponds to a test of the joint hypothesis:
,0
Nii
   that sets to zero the coefficients on the causal variable across units in the panel. We 
use an extension of White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator to account for 
possible heteroskedasticity in the data. Furthermore, when the sample size is limited, the use of the full set of 
moment conditions can lead to poor finite-sample performance for the GMM estimator (Andersen and Sorensen, 
1996; Ahn and Schmidt, 1995); that is the reason why the 3SLS-GMM estimator used here only involves the 
information contained in the equation in differences. Indeed, Andersen and Sorensen (1996), Bowsher (2002) and 
Roodman (2007) document that instrument proliferation can distort the size of the test: when the instrument count 
is too large relative to the time series dimension, the test never rejects the null hypothesis. Thus, many instruments 
tend to produce perfect p values of 1.00 for the Hansen J statistic. Hence, to address our concern for undersized 
tests and produce reliable results, we purposely choose a moderate number of instruments for the causality tests to 
produce reliable results. Further, we tackle potential weak instrument problems. As pointed out by Stock, Wright 
and Yogo (2002), Stock and Yogo (2005), unfortunate consequences of weak instruments are twofold: first they 
may cause instrumental variable estimators to be biased; second hypothesis tests of parameters estimated by 
instrumental variable estimators may suffer from severe size distortions that produce misleading results. After 
checking for the validity of the instruments, we test the relevance of the instruments for the causal relations to 
hold.  
3.3 Variables 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is measured as the ratio of FDI inflows and FDI outflows to GDP; likewise, 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) is measured for each country, as the sum, in absolute value, of equity securities 
assets and equity securities liabilities standardized by GDP
5
.  
The control variables for the globalization (FDI/FPI) equations are the following: 
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 Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett (2007, chap. 3, p.74-75): “Whenever 10% or more of the voting shares in a U.S. company 
are held by foreign investors, the investment is classified as a foreign direct investment. In contrast, when the investment does 
not reach the 10% ownership threshold of direct investment, it is classified as a portfolio investment. If a U.S. resident 
purchases shares in a Japanese firm but it does not reach the 10% threshold, it is classified as a portfolio investment (i.e. an 
outflow of capital)”, or equity securities asset. Conversely, equity is treated as a liability of the issuing institutional unit. “In 
principle, world portfolio investment assets should equal world portfolio investment liabilities” (IMF, News Brief 2000). 
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1) Trade openness, used by Eichengreen and Leblang (2008), is measured as the logarithm of the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services. The more a country is open and integrated into the world 
economy, the greater the likelihood for the country to attract FDI.  
2) Distance is the logarithm of the total physical distance, using latitude and longitude coordinates, 
separating the capital city of each country (i=1,….,N) to the capital city j of the 15 countries with the 
largest market capitalization in 2005, i.e., 

 15,,1 j
iji
dd
 
Distance is a proxy for informational asymmetries, (Portes and Rey, 2005, Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). 
A negative sign is expected on both measures FDI/FPI. 
3)  Market capitalization is measured as a share of GDP. Market capitalization represents financial markets’ 
size, (Portes and Rey, 2005). We expect financial development to attract more FDI. 
4) The index of Law and Order, used by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), is 
measured on a scale from 0 to 6 (the best outcome). The index of Law and Order is an assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system, and of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can 
enjoy a high rating in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating if it suffers from a high crime rate, and 
if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction. Thus, the higher the law and order in the 
country, the more predictable regulatory environment, the less prone to unexpected reversals, the more the 
government commits itself to protect investors and hence the greater the likelihood to attract FDI.  
5) The investment profile measures the risk to investment, i.e. the risk of expropriation, repudiation costs. 
Albuquerque (2003) argues that FPI is easier to expropriate than other types of investment. The assigned 
risk rating is the sum of three subcomponents, i.e., contract viability and expropriation risk, profits 
repatriation and payment delays, (a score of 4 =very low risk and a score of 0=very high risk). The higher 
the index of investment profile, the better the investment environment, hence a positive sign is expected 
on FPI.  
We consider two different measures of privatization used in previous studies (e.g., Bortolotti, Fantini and 
Siniscalco, 2003; Boubakri, Cosset, and Smaoui, 2009): (1) the ratio of privatization proceeds to GDP as a 
measure of the volume of privatization (PRIVPROC); (2) the number of share issue privatization (SIP) to the total 
number of privatization transactions (Public Offers and Private Sales), (PRIVMETH) captures the method of 
privatization and the willingness of the government to use the stock market as a source of financing. 
The control variables for the privatization equation are the following: 
(1) A measure of credit rating provided by Institutional Investor. Bankers are asked to grade each of the 
countries on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing those with the least chance of default. Financial 
distressed governments are more likely to privatize, (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003).  
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(2) A dummy variable for the legal environment since, in contrast to common law countries, civil law 
countries are not strong advocates of investors’ protection, and therefore less prone to privatize, 
(Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003).  
(3) A measure of political constraints constructed by Henisz (2000) that measures the feasability of a change 
in policy given the structure of a nation’s political institutions (number of veto points) and the preferences 
of the actors that inhabit them (the partisan alignment of various veto points and the heterogeneity or 
homogeneity of the preferences within each branch). Possible scores range from zero (most hazardous) to 
one (most constrained). 
(4) A dummy variable for the political orientation of the government since a right-wing government 
(outcome=1) is more likely to privatize than a left-wing government (outcome=0), (Bortolotti, Fantini and 
Siniscalco, 2003).  
(5) An index of corruption within the political system (outcome=6 with very low risk), (outcome=0, with 
very high risk). Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997, p.419) analyzed corruption and privatization 
phenomena for transition economies finding that both phenomena tend to be positively correlated: “If you 
think privatization is corrupt, try without it.” 6 
 
4 Empirical Results 
Our sample consists of 56 developing economies
7
, over the period 1984 to 2006, with yearly observations. 
The sample ends up in 2006, so that the data is not contaminated by the financial crisis that started in summer 
2007. The list and the definition of the variables as well as their data sources appear in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the main variables, including deviations from normality such as 
asymmetries (skewness coefficients far from 0), and fat-tailed features (kurtosis coefficients far from 3). Although 
trade openness looks close to a normal variable once it has been transformed into logarithm, the normal 
distribution is strongly rejected from the data. All other variables strongly reject the null hypothesis of normality. 
 
                                                          
6
 Anonymous official, in response to the Ukrainian parliament's decision to halt the privatization program on the grounds of 
possible corrupt methods (1994) 
7
 The sample of emerging economies consists of Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Macadonia, Romania, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Venezual, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Insert Table 2 here. 
 
4.1 Correlations 
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations between the main variables. The correlation between both measures of 
privatization and FDI is positive and significant at the 5% significance level, suggesting a potential relation 
between privatization and globalization. The correlation coefficients between both measures of privatization and 
FPI are not significant suggesting an unclear relation between both phenomena. As for the control variables, trade 
openness is positively correlated with both measures of globalization at the 5% significance level, as predicted by 
the literature. Indeed, the less barriers to trade, the more direct and portfolio investors are attracted into the 
country. Also, the extent of privatization in terms of revenues is more likely in trade liberalized economies. 
Further, the higher the sovereign credit ratings, the less likely the default for the governments, the more confident 
foreign portfolio investors, the more foreign portfolio investment will flow into the economies. In the same vein, 
the more developed the financial markets, the more likely foreign portfolio investors will be attracted to 
developing economies. Furthermore, the strong correlation between the stock market capitalization and FPI, as 
twice as much as FDI, supports the claim that financial development matters more to foreign portfolio investors 
than to foreign direct investors who look for majority ownership stakes to benefit from an ownership 
concentration (see LLSV, 1998, 1999). In view of the positive and significant correlation between investment 
profile and FPI, foreign portfolio investors are more likely to invest in a friendly investment environment while 
foreign direct investors seem less sensitive to the investment profile. Indeed, Albuquerque (2003) argues that 
portfolio investors are easier to expropriate than other types of investors. Likewise, privatizing governments are 
more likely to drain revenues in a friendlier investment environment. The positive and significant correlation 
between the corruption index and FPI, meaning that the less risk of corruption, the more foreign portfolio 
investors will invest, supports the claim that portfolio investments are more sensitive to institutional indicators 
such as the degree of corruption than FDI (see Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). Interestingly, the better the 
institutional indicators i.e., investment profile and corruption index, the higher are the sovereign credit ratings. 
These univariate relations, although informative, do not exploit all cross-sectional information contained in the 
data. Hence a multivariate analysis is required. 
 
Insert Table 3 here. 
 
4.2 Impact of globalization on privatization 
We observe from Table 4 that globalization tends to boost privatization revenues, when globalization is measured 
by FDI, bringing strong evidence in favour of our hypothesis (H1A). Further, the higher the sovereign credit 
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rating, the less likely the default, the less the government needs to privatize in order to drain revenues. In addition, 
we make use of the political constraints index built by Henisz (2000, p.5) as a measure of the feasibility of change 
in policy that gauge the “ability of political institutions to provide a credible commitment to private property 
rights”. Thus, Henisz (2000, p.5) develops a measure of institutional commitment that uses “the number of 
independent veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them”. 
Hence, the higher the political constraints index designed by Henisz (2000, p.3), the more likely the government 
is willing to “credibly commit not to interfere with private property rights”, the less uncertainty for investors, the 
more privatization proceeds will flow into the economy. As Perotti (1995) has shown, populist governments tend 
to avoid gradual sales and tend to interfere, even after the sale, through policy changes (regulation, taxation, 
changes in regulated rates,…). The author argues that (1995, p.848), “gradual sales (with immediate transfer of 
control) imply that the government is willing to bear residual risk, a signal that it does not intend to redistribute 
value through a future shift in policy.“ Further, the less the risk of corruption, the more privatization proceeds are 
drained into the economies, as less corrupt governments tend to maximize revenues instead of selling at 
discounted prices to favoured bidders. Regarding the method of privatization, the more foreign direct investors are 
involved, the more share issue privatizations are issued on the stock market, which sustains our hypothesis (H1B). 
Interestingly, the control variables impact the method of privatization differently: this time, the higher the 
sovereign credit ratings, the less likely the default, the more share issue privatizations take place on the stock 
market. In contrast to the privatization proceeds, the less the risk of corruption, the less SIPs are issued on the 
stock market; in other words, when the degree of corruption is high, privatizing on the stock market instead of 
using direct sales helps to regulate the economic environment. Further, legal institutions do matter in privatizing 
countries, but the negative effect from the legal origin on privatization proceeds is controversial, as revenues from 
privatization should be more important in English common law countries than in French civil law countries (see 
Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003). However, the negative sign is mainly due to the importance of civil law 
countries in our sample, as all the countries with high average privatization revenues have a civil law legal 
system. Finally, the results do not support the hypothesis that FPI affects privatization; although a relation has 
been pinned down for different specifications, it is nevertheless unstable and very sensitive to the sample size. 
Regarding the Arellano and Bond test for the autocorrelation in the residuals, the outputs in Table 4 provide no 
evidence that the model is misspecified at the 5% conventional level for the privatization proceeds, while this is 
unclear for the method of privatization. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
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4.3 Impact of privatization on globalization 
As shown in Table 5, we find strong evidence in favour of hypothesis (H2A) that privatization proceeds positively 
affect FDI. Similarly, the data do support hypothesis (H2B) that share issue privatization on the stock market 
helps to deepen globalization, when globalization is measured by FDI. Meanwhile, FPI flows are very sensitive to 
the risks of expropriation and to profits repatriation that determine a good-quality environment for foreign 
investors, as pointed out by Daude and Fratzscher (2008). Indeed, foreign portfolio investors are more sensitive to 
institutional indicators than FDI, as they are easier to expropriate than direct investors. To overcome the lower 
protection offered to investor, foreign investors typically look for majority ownership stakes which are more 
likely to be obtained through private sales transactions rather than on the stock market. Majority stakes allow 
foreign investors to benefit from an ownership concentration that has been shown to be inversely related to 
investor protection (see LLSV, 1998, 1999). Moreover, Distance that proxies for information asymmetries (Portes 
and Rey, 2005; Daude and Fratzscher, 2008) displays the negative expected sign, meaning that the more distant 
the economies, the most likely information asymmetries will prevail. Trade openness and financial development 
spur foreign investment into the economy, as “global trade as a share of GDP rose from 7.7% to 19.5%, and the 
share of countries open to international capital flows rose from 25% to 38%” between 1975 and 2002 (see 
Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008, p. 290). Overall, the most important lesson we can draw from Table 5 is the 
striking impact from both measures of privatization on FDI. The effect is inconclusive for FPI. 
 
Insert Table 5 here. 
 
4.4 Panel causality tests 
In the previous section, we have examined the sign and the statistical significance of the coefficients. A formal 
causality test is required, however, to assess the existence and the direction of the causal relation between 
privatization and globalization. First, we test, in Table 6, the null hypothesis that privatization proceeds do not 
cause FDI, after controlling for its well-known determinants (trade openness and financial development, the 
quality of institutions, and information frictions). We ask ourselves whether privatization proceeds carry relevant 
extra information that is not already contained in the past observations of FDI. In other words, regressing FDI on 
its own past and other explanatory variables is not sufficient to capture all the variations in the law of motion of 
FDI. The causality tests are thus conducted using a 3SLS estimator with GMM-style instruments to overcome 
endogeneity/simultaneity problems. Besides, the causal effects are measured in a dynamic relation including two 
lags of the endogenous variable. Further, the reverse causality running from globalization to privatization is 
investigated, when testing whether FDI does not cause privatization. In view of the small p-values shown in panel 
A (Table 6), or the large values of the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic, we strongly reject the null hypothesis that 
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FDI does not cause privatization at all conventional significance levels, and vice-versa. Indeed, the critical points 
given by a chi-squared distribution with 24 degrees of freedom (number of restrictions tested) at the 5%, 1% 
significance levels are equal to 36.41 and 42.98, respectively, which are much smaller than the LR reported values 
in panel A (Table 6). However, when globalization is measured by FPI as shown in panel B (Table 6), we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no-causality between privatization and FPI and vice-versa. As Table 5 already 
suggested, the results do not support our conjecture that privatization proceeds contribute to explain the law of 
motion of FPI. In other words, when globalization is measured by FPI, privatization proceeds do not bring extra 
information beyond what is already contained in the past dynamic of FPI. The reverse causality running from FPI 
to privatization proceeds is not supported by the data. In sum, we provide statistical evidence in favour of a bi-
directional causality running from privatization to globalization that holds only for FDI. A technical appendix is 
available upon request from the authors that describes the details of the procedure for those interested in 
replicating the results. 
 
Insert Table 6, panels A and B here. 
 
4.5 Tests for weak instruments 
To detect whether or not the causality tests reported above could be influenced by weak instruments problems, we 
further perform tests of weak instruments. A glance at the first-stage regression statistics enables us to detect the 
presence of weak instruments, as instrumental variable estimators display less bias when instruments are strongly 
correlated with the endogeneous variable. Just looking at the 
2R and adjusted 
2R can be misleading, as those 
statistics can be large even though instruments are weak. The partial 
2R is robust to correlation between the 
endogeneous variable and the included exogeneous variables in the regression. Based on those statistics, we 
observe that the first sixth lags of PRIV have a better explanatory power than the first sixth lags of FDI and FPI, 
whose 
2R  are lower8. Similarly, the F statistics for the joint significance of the coefficients on the additional 
instruments are strongly significant. All F statistics are larger than 10
9
, as recommended by Stock, Wright and 
Yogo (2002) for inference based on the 2SLS estimator to be reliable when there is one endogeneous regressor. 
The minimum eigenvalue statistic, recommended by Cragg and Donald (1993), provides a further test of weak 
instruments, whose values are exactly equal to the F statistics. Using the first characterization of weak instruments 
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005), whatever relative bias (2SLS relative to OLS) we are willing to tolerate, the 
                                                          
8
 The R-squares, adjusted R-squares and partial R-squares are respectively 0,4083, 0,3963 and 0,4041 for the first sixth lags 
of PRIV, (0.1474, 0.1359, 0.1114 for the first sixth lags of FDI, respectively; 0.1454, 0.1265, 0.1445 for the first sixth lags of 
FPI). 
9
 The first-stage 2SLS regression F statistics are respectively F(6,539)=60.92 for PRIV, F(6,818)=17.10 for FDI and 
F(6,496)=13.96 for FPI. 
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F statistic displayed by PRIV exceeds the critical values
10
. In contrast, for FDI and FPI we need to increase the 
2SLS relative bias to 10% to be able to reject the null of weak instruments. Regarding the second characterization 
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005), who show that hypothesis tests of parameters estimated by instrumental 
variable estimators may suffer from severe size distortions, again PRIV displays a F statistic that is higher than all 
critical values corresponding to the 5% nominal size of the Wald test
11
. In contrast for FDI (resp. for FPI), if we 
are not willing to tolerate an actual rejection rate larger than 15% for a 5% nominal size test (20% for FPI), then 
the set of instruments is weak. However, using the LIML estimator instead allows us to reject the null hypothesis 
of weak instruments for FDI and FPI as both F statistics exceed 4.45
12
. We may therefore conclude that the 
causality tests based on those instruments do not suffer from size distortions due to weak instruments that would 
produce misleading results. 
 
4.6 Robustness checks 
To verify that our results are robust, we conduct a series of controls related to alternative data frequency, and 
additional control variables such as the political orientation, the anti-self-dealing index and international 
accounting standards. 
 
4.6.1 Data Averaged Over Three-Year Periods 
As foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment and privatization proceeds are all sensitive to the 
business cycle, we consider three-year averaged data instead of annual data to abstract from business cycle 
influences. Still, FDI positively affects privatization proceeds at the 1% significance, but not the method of 
privatization. Again, we observe that privatization proceeds positively and significantly impact FDI, supporting 
once again hypothesis H2A after controlling for business cycle influences. Regarding the privatization method, 
the results obtained on averaged data are not supportive of hypothesis H2B anymore. Most control variables 
remain significant and robust to business cycle influences. Due to space constraints, the results are not reported, 
but are available upon request. 
 
4.6.2 Additional Control Variables: the political orientation variable POLITO 
To test for the robustness of the results shown in Table 4, we substitute the political orientation variable POLITO 
to the political constraints variable Polcon. We can observe in Table 7 that FDI still boosts privatization proceeds, 
                                                          
10
 The 2SLS relative bias critical value for one endogenous regressor is 19.28 at 5% and 11.12 at 10%. 
11
 The critical values corresponding to the 2SLS size of a nominal 5% Wald test is equal to 29.18 for an actual rejection rate 
of 10%, 16.23 for an actual rejection rate of 15% and to 11.72 for an actual rejection rate of 20%. 
12
 The critical values corresponding to the LIML size of a nominal 5% Wald test is equal to 4.45 for an actual rejection rate of 
10% and 3.34 for an actual rejection rate of 15%. 
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(but the effect is lost for the privatization method). Most control variables remain significant with the same sign. 
Interestingly, the political orientation variable POLITO is significant with the same sign as Polcon, which 
supports the claim that right-wing governments are more likely to privatize than left-wing governments, as 
pointed out by Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2003). More specifically, right-wing governments, who are 
market-oriented, are more likely to drain revenues from privatization, as they are more concerned with 
maximizing sales revenues. Interestingly, FPI does contribute to privatization proceeds in this specification with 
an economically and statistically significant coefficient (at the 1% level). Also, FPI seems sensitive to control 
variables and to sample size. 
Insert Table 7 here. 
 
4.6.3 Additional Control Variables: Anti-self-dealing index and International Accounting Standards 
We also test whether the results are robust to other control variables, including International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), that is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for countries that comply with IAS, or declare 
intended, and 0 otherwise. In the FDI specification, the law and order variable is replaced with the International 
Accounting Standards variable, while the legal origin variable is replaced in the FPI specification. We find that 
the strong positive effects between privatization proceeds and FDI displayed in Tables 4 and 5 do survive (at the 
1% significance level) while the weak effects between FDI and SIPs do vanish when introducing the IAS variable.  
We also control for the anti-self dealing-index, whose index has been downloaded from Andrei Schleifer’s 
webpage. The index, introduced by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), addresses the ways 
in which the law deals with corporate self-dealing in a theoretical way. The authors start with “a stylized self-
dealing transaction, and then measure the hurdles that the controlling shareholder must jump” for his transaction 
to get through (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008, p. 432). “The higher the hurdles, the 
higher is the anti-self-dealing index”, or the stronger is the minority shareholder’s protection. As the index is not 
available in panel, we compute the median value over all countries and then construct a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 for countries whose anti-self-dealing index is higher than the median and 0 otherwise. We then 
replace the legal system variable with the anti-self dealing dummy variable in the regressions. After controlling 
for investors’ rights protection, the strong positive effects between privatization proceeds and FDI, shown in 
Tables 4 and 5, still remain (at the 1% significance level). However, the significant effect of FDI on SIPs reported 
in Table 4 is not robust to the anti-self dealing index, since the coefficient is not significant anymore. Similarly, 
the significant effect from SIPs to FDI does not hold anymore when the legal origin variable is replaced with the 
anti-self dealing variable. Thus, the strong positive relations between FDI and privatization proceeds (at 1% 
significance levels) are robust to anti-self-dealing index while most of the control variables remain significant and 
robust to it. Although the anti-self dealing variable is not significant for FDI, it matters for FPI whose coefficient 
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is significant; this emphasizes the importance of investors’ rights protection for portfolio investors (see LLSV, 
1998, 1999; Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003; Albuquerque, 2003; Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). Due to 
space constraints, the results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we examine the link between globalization (FDI/FPI) and privatization of state-owned enterprises in 
a multi-country sample that focuses on developing countries. We conjecture that privatization has an effect on 
globalization as the process of fostering private sector participation often involved the allocation of substantial 
shares to foreign investors in newly privatized firms. Similarly, we expect FDI /FPI to foster privatization efforts 
as new capital inflows, technology and managerial skills that accompany globalization make the economic 
environment more prone to competition, thus fostering GDP growth. We provide strong evidence of a bi-
directional positive relation between privatization proceeds and FDI. Furthermore, although the link connecting 
FDI/FPI to the extent of share issue privatizations is more difficult to identify, we find a positive relation running 
from FDI to share issue privatizations, and vice-versa. In sum, by improving the investment climate, privatization 
helps to attract investors, domestic and foreign alike, and contributes to enhance the growth and development 
process. 
A policy implication of our study is that privatization programs in an economic environment that is 
investment-friendly can draw foreign investors who will bring the capital flows, technology and managerial skills 
that are needed to turn around inefficient firms. As shown in this study, FDI flows have accompanied and 
responded positively to government privatization programs in developing countries. In addition, the intensity of 
privatization programs seems to have been strengthened by massive increases in FDI flows which continued to 
increase throughout the 2000s. It is thus no surprise that several privatization transactions on the stock market 
involved the sale of a tranche directly aimed at foreign investors. Both phenomena, the worldwide launching of 
privatization programs and FDI flows seem therefore to have a reinforcing dynamic in all settings. Regarding 
portfolio investment flows, the evidence of such a relationship is weaker: the formal causality test does not 
support the existence of a causal relation between FPI and privatization proceeds. To our knowledge, ours is the 
first multinational empirical study on the potential bi-directional relation between privatization and FDI/FPI 
flows.  
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Table 1: Definitions, Proxies and Data sources 
Variable Proxy Label Exp. sign Source 
Foreign direct investment Sum of inflows and outflows standardized by the GDP  FDI + IMF data base 
          
Foreign portfolio 
investment Sum in absolute value of equity securities assets  FPI + International  Financial Statistics  
  and equity securities liabilities standardized by the GDP       
          
Privatization proceeds Annual privatization proceeds standardized by the GDP PRIVPROC + 
SDC Platinium, Thomson 
Financial  
          
Method of Privatization Number of privatizations by share issues to the total PRIVMETH + 
SDC Platinium, Thomson 
Financial  
  number of privatizations       
          
Trade openness Log of the sum of imports and exports of good and services TRADE + World Development Indicator  
          
Law and Order Assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system LO + International Country Risk Guide  
   and of popular observance of the law.       
          
Market capitalization Market capitalization as a share of GDP Marketcap + World Development Indicators  
          
Distance Distance is the logarithm of the total physical distance,  Distance - CIA: The World Factbook 
  using latitude and longitude coordinates between the home capital        
  city i and the capital city j of the 15 largest market        
  capitalization countries.       
          
Investment profile Risk rating assigned to contract viability,  Invest_profile + International Country Risk Guide  
  expropriation risk, profits repatriation and payment delays,        
  (a score of 4 =very low risk and a score of 0=very high risk)       
          
Sovereign credit ratings Bankers are asked to grade each of the countries on a scale of zero  Credit ratings + Institutional Investor 
  to 100, with 100 representing those with the least chance of default.       
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Table 1: Definitions, Proxies and Data sources 
Variable Proxy Label 
Exp. 
sign Source 
Corruption Measure of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations,  Corruption + International Country Risk Guide  
  secret party funding, (a score of 6 =very low risk        
  and a score of 0=very high risk).       
          
Legal Origin Dummy that is equal to one if the legal origin is common law,  Legal + La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer  
  and zero otherwise.     and Vishny (1998) 
          
Political constraints The political constraints index measures the feasability of a change in   Polcon + Henisz’s webpage 
 index policy given the structure of a nation’s political institutions        
  (number of veto points) and the preferences of the actors that inhabit them       
  (the partisan alignment of various veto points and the heterogeneity or        
  homogeneity of the preferences within each branch). Possible scores range        
  from zero (most hazardous) to one (most constrained).       
          
Political Orientation 1 right-wing, 0 left-wing POLITO + Database on Political Institutions  
        (WORLD BANK) 
          
Anti-self-dealing 
A dummy variable which takes the value 1 for countries whose anti-self-
dealing  
Anti-self-
dealing  + Andrei Shleifer’s webpage 
dummy index is higher than the median and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable is       
  constructed from the anti-self dealing index provided by Djankov et al (2008).       
          
IAS International Accounting Standards compliance: dummy=1 if the  IAS + Financial Standards foundation 
  country enacted or declared intended; dummy=0 if no compliance at all.        
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Var FDI FPI Privproc Privmeth Trade Market cap Invest_profile Legal Credit Polcon 
Mean 3.145 .0053 .4050 .1166 4.134 30.761 5.549 .1406 29.342 .2807 
Median 1.800 .0003 0 0 4.146 16.542 6 0 27.675 .34 
Std. error 10.788 .0139 1.232 .2839 .5338 44.372 3.217 .3477 18.939 .2154 
Skewness 26.323 5.499 5.648 2.532 -.3557 4.042 -.341 2.067 .2239 -.0999 
Kurtosis 813.727 44.284 43.125 7.916 3.044 28.317 2.383 5.274 2.286 1.615 
Test for 
normality 
Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected 
# obser 1307 1091 1360 678 1354 853 1472 1472 1472 1357 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients 
 FDI FPI Proc Meth Trade Credit rat. Legal marketcap Polcon Invest corr distance 
FDI 1.00            
FPI 0.2635* 1.00           
Proc 0.0883* 0.0498 1.00          
Meth 0.1571* 0.0590 -0.1280* 1.00 1.        
Trade 0.1464* 0.1430* 0.1140* 0.0860* 1.00        
Credit rat. 0.0149 0.2959* 0.0600* 0.1947* 0.1811* 1.00       
Legal -0.0558* 0.0582 -0.0786* -0.0172 -0.0270 0.1735* 1.00      
marketcap 0.1371* 0.2667* -0.0588 0.1496* 0.1867* 0.3416* 0.3257* 1.00     
Polcon 0.2004* 0.2314* 0.1666* 0.0124 0.1392* 0.2942* 0.0371 0.0788* 1.00    
Invest 0.0217 0.1976* 0.1008* 0.1365* 0.0917* 0.6535* 0.0993* 0.1546* 0.2208* 1.00   
corr -0.0704* 0.0664* 0.0510 -0.1033* -0.1220* 0.4120* 0.1522* 0.1224* 0.0925* 0.5641* 1.00  
distance -0.0286 -0.0866* -0.0627* 0.0085 -0.3354* 0.0711* 0.1354* 0.2006* 0.0839* 0.2511* 0.3101* 1.00 
Significance at the 5% level is indicated with a *. 
.
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Table 4: Impact of globalization on privatization 
itiitititit
CLVFDIPRIVPROCPRIVPROC  
 111  
itiitititit
CLVFPIPRIVMETHPRIVMETH  
 111
 
 PRIVPROC PRIVMETH  PRIVPROC PRIVMETH 
 FDI   FPI  
      
Lag 1 .1186451* .0588262  .0933022** .0359217 
FDI .1402149*** .023519*** FPI -.4264508 .0117124 
Credit_ratings -.007795*** .0036005***  -.0016702 .0058788*** 
Legal -.0735445 .0040136  -.3236766*** -.0400572 
Polcon .4678844*** -.0523354  1.067725*** -.0319919 
Corruption .0501093* -.0406985***  .0755613** -.0411898*** 
      
Hansen J 
test(pvalue) 
1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
A-B test for 
AR(1) (pvalue) 
0.004 0.006  0.004 0.020 
A-B test for 
AR(2) (pvalue) 
0.258 0.035  0.209 0.032 
# Observations 1237 491  1026 415 
***, **, * refer to significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. PRIVPROC and PRIVMETH are two 
different measures of privatization, while FDI and FPI are two different measures of globalization. The 
Arellano and Bond test applied to the residual in differences should find spurious autocorrelation of order 1 
and no sign of autocorrelation of order 2. The Hansen J statistic tests for the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions.  
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Table 5: Impact of privatization on globalization 
itiitititit
CLVPRIVFDIFDI  
 111  
itiitititit
CLVPRIVFPIFPI  
 111
 
 FDI FPI  FDI FPI 
 PRIVPROC   PRIVMETH  
      
Lag 1 .7035885*** .7883243***  .5704496*** .7397486*** 
PRIVPROC .4651913*** -.0000716 PRIVMETH 1.202336** .0004282 
Invest_profile  .0001309*   .0001739** 
Legal  -.0005763   .0002044 
Distance -.195725***   -.280203***  
Marketcap .0048564 .0000373*  .0028938 .0000351 
Trade open. .6919463***   1.062549***  
Law_order .0392895   .106531  
      
Hansen J 
test(pvalue) 
1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
A-B test for 
AR(1) (pvalue) 
0.000 0.009  0.003 0.043 
A-B test for 
AR(2) (pvalue) 
0.184 0.046  0.209 0.176 
# Observations 838 680  564 455 
***, **, * refer to significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. PRIVPROC and PRIVMETH are two 
different measures of privatization, while FDI and FPI are two different measures of globalization. The 
Arellano and Bond test applied to the residual in differences should find spurious autocorrelation of order 1 
and no sign of autocorrelation of order 2. The Hansen J statistic tests for the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions. The control variables for the FDI regression include distance, market cap, trade, and law and 
order, while they include invest-profile, corruption, distance and market cap for FPI regression. 
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Table 6: Panel Causality tests with 3SLS-GMM style instruments 
Panel A: Bi-directional causation between privatization and FDI 
 FDIPRIV   PRIVFDI   
LR stat 341.6627 88.8638 
pvalue 0.000 0.000 
# Observations 289 289 
Control var. included   
Trade open. YES  
Distance YES  
Law and order YES  
Market cap YES  
Credit ratings  YES 
Legal  YES 
Polcon  YES 
Corruption  YES 
Panel B: Failure to reject the noncausality between privatization and FPI 
 FPIPRIV   PRIVFPI   
LR stat 0.010007 3.2119 
pvalue 1.000 0.9999998 
# Observations 289 289 
Control var. included   
Invest_profile YES  
Distance YES  
Law and order YES  
Market cap YES  
Credit ratings  YES 
Legal  YES 
Polcon  YES 
Corruption  YES 
 
To test the null hypothesis of no causality running from x to y, we use the following specification on 
differentiated variables to remove the country-specific fixed effects 
i
 : 
,
~
22112211 titttttt
XXXYYY  
  
and four control variables in each specification. First, we test the null that the privatization proceeds 
measured by x = PRIV do not cause y =FDI(FPI), where the control variables for FDI(FPI) are distance, 
trade openness, law and order and market capitalization (investment profile, distance, law and order and 
market capitalization, respectively). Then, we test for the reverse causality, i.e. from y = FDI to 
x = PRIV, where the control variables for the privatization proceeds are the sovereign credit ratings, the 
legal origin, the political constraints index and the corruption index. The estimation methodology used to 
perform the tests is 3SLS with GMM-style instrumental variables as recommended in Holtz-Eakin, Newey 
and Rosen (1988), using the optimal GMM weighting matrix. We use the likelihood ratio test statistic, 
which is the difference between the restricted sum of squared residuals and the unrestricted sum of squared 
residuals. The likelihood ratio test statistic has a chi-square distribution as N grows, with the degree of 
freedom given by the number of restrictions.  
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Table 7 (Robustness Tests: Polito) 
itiitititit
CLVFDIPRIVPROCPRIVPROC  
 111  
itiitititit
CLVFPIPRIVMETHPRIVMETH  
 111
 
 PRIVPROC PRIVMETH  PRIVPROC PRIVMETH 
 FDI   FPI  
      
Lag 1 .1436752 .0074389  .1441655** .022292 
FDI .1516313*** .0055222 FPI 5.981634*** -.1317364 
Credit_ratings -.0073781** .0041045***  3.69e-06 .0047896*** 
Legal .0068317 -.0257118  -.3598651*** -.0111009 
Polito .2671076** .0056314  .2667068** -0.000004 
Corruption .0352376 -.0370872***  .0957248*** -.0381473*** 
      
Hansen J 
test(pvalue) 
1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
A-B test for 
AR(1) (pvalue) 
0.040 0.012  0.035 0.020 
A-B test for 
AR(2) (pvalue) 
0.481 0.163  0.334 0.130 
# Observations 779 315  643 263 
***, **, * refer to significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. PRIVPROC and PRIVMETH are two 
different measures of privatization, while FDI and FPI are two different measures of globalization. The 
Arellano and Bond test applied to the residual in differences should find spurious autocorrelation of order 1 
and no sign of autocorrelation of order 2. The Hansen J statistic tests for the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions.  
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